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This paper argues that colonialism not only affected the legal frameworks that are largely in 
place in the Indian sub-continent today, but laid the foundation for contemporary struggles of 
the socio-legal sphere in the region. As slightly distinct from the general scholarship on post-
colonialism and colonial continuation, this paper presents two main arguments. First, it 
suggests a move towards the idea of Coloniality to highlight the essence of the colonial (legal 
and epistemological) project, rather than focussing on the historical episode of colonialism. 
Second, linked with this, is the argument that the colonial encounter not only led to 
transformation of existent legal systems, but also radically altered the logics and rationalities 
that lay at their foundation. By focussing on the concept of Coloniality, its link with law and 
its place within Empire, the paper presents a way to understand the contestations between 
Islamic political ideals and state-authored legal systems in the Indian sub-continent, 
particularly in the context of Pakistan.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
‘Our desire is your law if you govern in our name, even before that desire has 
been articulated as a law to be obeyed.’1 
 
There is a curious link between colonialism’s use of the instrumentality of law, and the studies 
of law in the postcolonial contexts. That the colonial enterprise employed and transformed law 
in its various manifestations for the purposes of appropriation and control has certainly become 
a truism, owing to a varied corpus of legal, cultural, anthropological, political and theoretical 
discourses on this subject.2 Colonialism’s use of the instrumentality of law, its effect on the 
                                                        
 Assistant Professor, Warwick Law School, University of Warwick. I would like to express my gratitude to 
Dr George Meszaros, Dr Jayan Nayar, Prof Abdul Paliwala, Prof Werner Menski, Prof Shaheen Sardar Ali 
and Prof Walter Mignolo for their guidance on the wider research project. I am grateful to the organisers 
and participants of Harvard IGLP Conference 2015, and the anonymous reviewers of the journal, for their 
comments, critique and suggestions. 
1 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1999) 216-217. Spivak provides an intriguing account of the 
colonial master as a Freudian (Paranoid-Schizophrenic) Super Ego, where law and desire coincide. 
2 See, for instance Sally Engle Merry, 'Law and Colonialism' (1991) 25 Law & Society Review 890; Nicholas 
B. Dirks, 'Introduction: Colonialism and Culture' in Nicholas B. Dirks (ed), Colonialism and Culture 
(University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan 1992). 
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norms and cultures of local populations, and the consequent issues of postcolonial continuation 
have been widely discussed by a multitude of accounts. One may be tempted to consider it trite 
to reassert that colonialism impacted law and, arguably, continues to do so. 
But, along with the assertions of colonialism’s indelible mark on law in numerous 
societies, law has a penchant for appearing independent, removed and devoid of context. It 
calls to be treated on its own terms; to be understood as self-constituted. We are asked to look 
at law as a system of rules and procedures, as a union of norms, as a self-referential structure 
or as a command, foundational norm or sovereign will. Whichever position one might adopt, 
or however many perspectives one might be able to reconcile, it is taken to define the law 
which then acts as the key to understand all contexts across geographical and temporal divides. 
The varied engagements with public, private, constitutional, criminal, civil or international 
spheres granted, the law remains the same – independent, removed and devoid of context. 
The studies of postcolonial societies are caught within these paradoxical notions. On 
the one hand are the constant reminders of the hierarchical, racial, ethnocentric and 
epistemological differentiations by the colonial project(s), which utilized and transformed the 
structures and substance of law. On the other hand are calls to understand law’s functions, as 
well as its many failings, without much reference to that which surrounds it. State failures, 
insurgencies, extremism, disempowerment and violations of human rights are, we are 
reminded, to be considered as recent anomalies in need of explanations in the language of the 
law and the state. Deficiencies of implementation, issues of legitimacy, lack of development 
and the inherent violence within certain local or religious normative orderings are the answers 
that these questions often generate. Law in postcolonial societies asserts itself to be removed 
from context; studies of law, generally, acknowledge this claim. This is the reason why 
colonialism’s instrumentality of law and the studies of law in the postcolonial contexts present 
an intriguing link. 
This paper approaches the issue differently. It maintains that colonialism not just 
influenced legal and normative orderings in the colonies, but laid the very terrain in which law 
and normative systems function. The examination of law in these contexts, therefore, cannot 
escape the re-articulation of the shared history of law and colonialism. The colonial encounter 
in the Indian sub-continent was not just a conflict for resources between clashing Empires; it 
was also a clash between competing epistemologies, opposing logics of governance and 
conflicting normative orderings. On the one hand there were the Enlightenment promises of 
reason, fraternity and freedom, albeit coupled with colonial logic based on appropriation, 
classification, reification and domination; on the other side, a plethora of local normative 
systems based on historical traditions, religious diversity and pluralism, but carrying with them 
problems of patriarchy, communitarianism and intolerance. The encounter between these 
different nomoi,3 encompassing a heterogeneous array of orderings and perspectives within 
                                                        
3 The term nomos (plural nomoi) is used here in the sense of ‘normative universes’ in which we exist, and 
which are an intersection of the normative world and the physical-material world that surrounds us. See, 
Robert M. Cover, 'The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative' (1983) 97 Harvard 
Law Review 4. 
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them, presents us with a starting point from which we can judge the problems of the current 
legal and political state of affairs in the region. 
This paper argues that, while colonialism affected the legal frameworks that are largely 
in place in the region today, more importantly, it marked the foundation in which the struggles 
of the socio-legal sphere in the sub-continent are now panning out. As distinct from the general 
scholarship on post-colonialism and colonial continuation, this paper makes two main 
arguments. First, it suggests a move towards the idea of Coloniality to highlight the essence of 
the colonial (legal) project, rather than the historical episode of colonialism. Second, linked 
with this, is the argument that the colonial encounter not only led to transformation of existent 
legal systems, but also radically altered the logics and rationalities that lay at their foundation. 
It is suggested that Islamic legal tradition in the Indian sub-continent was not isolated from this 
encounter but was one of the normative systems, amongst many, which was left tainted and 
transformed through this struggle. By focussing on the concept of Coloniality, its link with law 
and its place within Empire, the paper presents a way to understand the contestations between 
Islamic political ideals and state-authored legal systems in the Indian sub-continent, 
particularly in the context of Pakistan. It is important to state at the outset that the task here is 
not to address the multiplicity present within Islamic jurisprudence, but the associated 
manifestations of legality and political projects which emerged through the colonial encounter 
and are largely in place today in the Indian sub-continent. A more nuanced understanding of 
the clash between these manifestations and the conventional approaches of state law in the 
region is an important theme which the paper will address through the lens of law and 
colonialism 
The following section discusses the importance of addressing the colonial legacy to 
understand the context of law in the sub-continent. Sections 3 and 4 develop the idea of 
Coloniality as a means to further the discussion on colonialism and discuss its engagement with 
the traditional and religious normative orderings, focussing primarily on indigenous tribunals 
and religious (particularly Islamic) law in the sub-continent. Through this examination, the 
paper will then present a different perspective on the conflict between religious ideology (in its 
current manifestation) and state law in Pakistan as a contestation of two rival perspectives, both 
carrying the same totalitarian rationality within them. This will be followed by a concluding 
section which will also highlight the issue of future directions. 
 
2 COLONIALISM AND THE SOCIO-LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE 
INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT 
A glance at the socio-legal situation of the Indian sub-continent today reveals a complex 
architecture of a multitude of legal and normative structures, emerging from the interplay of 
common law, international law, colonial law, as well as religious and indigenous normative 
systems. Various studies focussing on India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, among other countries, 
highlight the engagement and struggle, harmony and conflict between these diverse yet 
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overlapping normative orderings.4 Disparate as these may appear to be, a thread that runs 
through these manifestations of legality and normativity is their shared colonial history; what 
binds them together is their common past, even origin, based on the colonial encounter of the 
Indian sub-continent. 
The fact that remnants of the colonial legal system still exist within the formal legal 
systems of the region’s post-independence states has been extensively discussed and examined 
in the literature on this subject. The commercial and mercantile laws, codes of civil and 
criminal procedures and even the penal codes in force in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh today 
are largely a reformulation of the laws that the British Indian government implemented in the 
sub-continent.5 Although these laws have gone through significant changes in the post-
independence period – for instance, in the case of Pakistan the most prominent transformation 
was associated with the ‘Islamisation of Laws’ campaign during the Zia regime6 – the basic 
foundation of the laws and legal institutions laid during the colonial era is unmistakeably 
evident. It has been widely acknowledged that even the controversial blasphemy laws of the 
region reveal a religious (and majoritarian) modification of the provisions laid out in the penal 
code inherited at the time of independence.7  
In some instances the continued legacy of colonial law is even more apparent, as is the 
case with the (legal) framework that governs the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Born from the British 
colonial state’s need to safeguard its Indian Empire from the Pushtun tribes in the North West 
as well as the Russian Empire, these laws were mainly instituted to implement the ‘threefold 
Frontier’ policy to keep the colonies protected and the tribes in control.8 The principle that was 
adopted at the time – that is, to legally create a territory where the executive authority and the 
                                                        
4 For accounts of legal pluralism within South Asia, see generally, Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a 
Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006); Fauzia 
Shariff, 'Power Relations and Legal Pluralism: 'Strategies of Struggles' Amongst the Santal Adivasi of India 
and Bangladesh' (2008) 57 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1; Nasira Iqbal, 'Legal Pluralism 
in Pakistan and its implications on Women’s Rights' in Jennifer Bennett (ed), Scratching the Surface: 
Democracy, Traditions, Gender (Heinrich Boll Foundation, Lahore 2007). 
5 Martin Lau, 'Introduction to the Pakistani Legal System, with special reference to the Law of Contract' in 
Eugene Cotran and Chibli Mallat (eds), Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, vol 1 (Kluwer Law 
International, London 1994) 6.  
6 See, generally, Charles H. Kennedy, 'Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-1989' (1990) 63 
Pacific Affairs 62; Martin Lau, The Role of Islam in the Legal System of Pakistan (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2006); Rubya Mehdi, The Islamization of the Law in Pakistan (Nordic Institute of Asian 
Studies Monograph Series No 60, Curzon Press, Richmond, Surrey 1994). 
7 Raza Saeed, 'Metamorphosis of the Ideals and the Actuals: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan and the 
Transplantation of Justice in British India' (2013) 7 Pólemos: Journal of Law, Literature and Culture 235; 
Osama Siddique and Zahra Hayat, 'Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan - 
Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications' (2008) 17 Minnesota Journal of 
International Law 303. 
8 In 1907, Lord Curzon (who had been the Viceroy of India from 1899 to 1905) apprised the audience in a 
lecture at Oxford about the result of the pact that resulted in the creation of the Durand line: 
‘The result in the case of the Indian Empire is probably without precedent, for it gives to Great 
Britain not a single or double but a threefold Frontier, (1) the administrative border of British 
India, (2) the Durand Line, or Frontier of active protection, (3) the Afghan border, which is the 
outer or advanced strategical (sic.) Frontier.’  
George Nathaniel Curzon, 'Lord Curzon of Kedleston (Viceroy of India 1898-1905): 1907 Romanes 
Lecture on the subject of Frontiers' (Oxford, 1907). 
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criminal sanctions of the State may reach, but not the rights and guarantees that may be afforded 
to its subjects – was considered  a novel and successful experiment (from the vantage point of 
the Empire).9 Through this unique mechanism, the tribal groups were forced to exist in a 
‘relation of exception’10 with the Empire: they were not considered ‘subjects’ of either the 
British Empire or the Afghan Amir, although they were subject to coercion and criminal legal 
penalties from both sovereigns.11 The British colonial state’s need was to institute the Frontier 
as a barrier against the expanding Russian Empire, for which it created an ‘Imperial reasoning 
that included conceptions of subject, frontier, “their country”, and British dominion.’12 The fact 
that this legal framework has continued to exist in the post-independence State demonstrates 
that it is not only the legal formulations of colonialism that the region inherited, but also the 
logics and principles that provided the very foundation for such rules.13  
But while the effects of colonial encounter may be more evident in relation to 
constitutional and common law systems as well as the remnants of colonial regulations, even 
religious laws and indigenous structures of the region have not been immune to this influence.14 
The codification of the religious legal codes, coupled with the differentiation and application 
of ‘personal laws’ for Muslims and Hindus, were the main facets through which the colonial 
legal architecture attempted to govern the local population.15 Colonial law also created 
rudimentary forms of parallel justice systems, not just through the separation of Muslim and 
Hindu laws, but also by delimiting the substantive areas where indigenous and religious laws 
could be applicable. Some of the most evident rifts and tensions within the legal terrain today 
can be traced back to what transpired in the region before the countries themselves were born.  
The influence of colonialism, therefore, runs much deeper than the mentioned instances 
of prevalent laws. It not only provided the legal frameworks that are by and large in place in 
the Indian sub-continent today but it laid the foundation on which the socio-legal architecture 
stands and the normative struggles take place. This terrain, fashioned by the colonial 
administrators and marked by the categorisation of people, the classification of cultures, and 
                                                        
9 Ibid. 
10 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif. 
1998) 18. 
11 Robert Nichols, Settling the Frontier: Land, Law, and Society in the Peshawar Valley, 1500-1900 (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2001); Bijan Omrani, 'The Durand Line: History And Problems Of The Afghan-
Pakistan Border' (2009) 40 Asian Affairs 177, 187-188. 
12 Nichols, Settling the Frontier: Land, Law, and Society in the Peshawar Valley, 1500-1900 174. 
13 The legal framework governing the region revolves around The Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 
(Regulation No. III of 1901 as amended August 2011), Pakistan. Also, see, Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid 
Rehman, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities of Pakistan: Constitutional and Legal Perspectives 
(Curzon, Richmond 2001) 47. 
14 For a brief account on the emergence of Muslim Personal Law, see Scott Alan Kugle, 'Framed, Blamed 
and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic Jurisprudence in Colonial South Asia' (2001) 35 Modern Asian 
Studies 257; Lau, 'Introduction to the Pakistani Legal System, with special reference to the Law of 
Contract' 3. For an introduction to Anglo-Hindu Law, see Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: 
The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa 239. For an introduction to indigenous and local courts in South Asia, 
particularly Pakistan, see Ali and Rehman, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities of Pakistan: 
Constitutional and Legal Perspectives 93-94.  
15 H. W. C. Carnduff, 'Legislation and Justice' in Herbert Risley and others (eds), The Imperial Gazetteer of 
India: The Indian Empire Vol IV, vol 4 (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1909) 127. 
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the appropriation of norms charted the course that the legal and normative orders have taken 
since then. It is not possible to discuss the religious orthodoxies and militancy in the region 
without reference to this past; it is impractical to consider the persistent challenges to the state 
orderings without acknowledging the history. It was the colonial history that set such events in 
motion and, in this era of ‘terror’16 and militancy, it is important to be ‘vigilant of the colonial 
legacy’ and the radical transformation of cultural and normative orderings.17 
 
3 FROM COLONIALISM TO COLONIALITY 
Ebrahim Moosa, one of the most prominent contemporary Muslim scholars, writes that the 
European encounter with the colonies was marked by acculturation and transculturation. 
Acculturation refers to the ‘acquisition of culture in a one-directional manner and a linear 
arrangement of power: from the powerful to the powerless.’18 He argues that it was this 
acquisition and dislocation of cultures that characterised the colonial encounter. The void 
created by this displacement of local norms and cultures was filled by transculturation – the 
emergence of a new cultural and normative system through a process that was ‘non-linear and 
unpredictable’.19 Borrowing from Edward Said, he writes that this process of transculturation 
was based on contrapuntal developments and resulted in an intermeshing of dominant and non-
dominant cultural systems.20 The nomos that emerged from this encounter was therefore neither 
a cultural imposition nor the untainted normative system that previously governed the domain. 
One consequence of this contrapuntal development, Moosa suggests, is that the colonial regime 
had to ‘accommodate’ Muslim law of the sub-continent, albeit in the form of ‘Anglo-
Muhammadan Law’.21 The various facets of judicial and administrative systems, including 
courts, judges and texts, had to be adapted so as to include translations, religious scholars as 
court officers and the legal precepts and codes of religious orders.  
But while the conceptual framework of acculturation and transculturation certainly 
holds credence, employing the terminology of ‘accommodation’ to address the engagement 
between local normative orders and colonial legal regimes implies that this co-optation was 
either intentional, incidental or governed solely by the necessities of colonial governance. 
Some other accounts go even further to make similar arguments and link the employment of 
local legal, normative and cultural systems by the colonial regime as means to breach the 
                                                        
16 For a classification of ‘War of Terror’ and ‘War on Terror’ presented by Baxi, see Upendra Baxi, Human 
Rights in a Posthuman World: Critical Essays (Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2009) 156. 
17 Ebrahim Moosa, 'Colonialism and Islamic Law' in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Armando Salvatore and 
Martin van Bruinessen (eds), Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates (Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh 2009) 160. 
18 Ibid 158-159. 
19 Ibid. 
20 For Said’s discussion on ‘counterpoints’ and contrapuntal readings, see generally Edward W. Said, Culture 
and Imperialism (Vintage Books-Random House, New York 1993); May Telmissany and Stephanie Tara 
Schwartz (eds), Counterpoints: Edward Said’s Legacy (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne 
2010). 
21 Moosa, 'Colonialism and Islamic Law' 158-159. ‘Anglo-Hindu’ law emerged from the same engagement; 
see Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa 239. 
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language barriers, improve administration or fulfil the needs of governance.22 Others, still, go 
as far as to emphasize the respect that the colonial administrators had for local normative and 
cultural orderings. William H. Morley, a British jurist of the time with considerable knowledge 
of colonial administrative policies, for instance, wrote in 1858:  
Warren Hastings [the first Governor General of British India], in pursuance of that 
enlightened and liberal policy which so eminently distinguished his government in 
India in all that regarded the conciliation and welfare of its native inhabitants, was… 
the first to recommend and adopt the preservation of their [natives’] laws.23 
 
However, considering the appropriation of local normative orders as acts of preservation and 
accommodation ignores the ‘cognitive model’24 that was inherent in the colonial enterprise. It 
disregards the fact that it was the knowledge of the local and the indigenous that ‘both enabled 
colonial conquest and was [in turn] produced by it.’25 In its desire to understand, define and 
control the other it had encountered, the colonial enterprise had to establish classifications of 
religions, cultures and castes, which became reified with the passage of time. As Dirks argues, 
‘representation in the colonial context was violent; classification a totalising form of control.’26 
Randeria similarly writes that despite the assertions of modernity, nationalism and 
homogenisation in the metropolis, the colonies were marked by differentiation and 
enumeration.27 The impact of this ‘production of difference’ continued after independence, so 
that religious groups and ethnic communities in the Indian sub-continent ‘as we know them 
today are very much a product of enumeration, classification and categorisation by the colonial 
state.’28 Dirks suggests that while it was imperfect and partial, ‘colonial knowledge was both 
facilitated and certified by colonial power,’29 and it in turn supplemented the governance 
regime. We know, since Foucault,30 of the intricate nexus between power and knowledge, and 
nowhere is this nexus more evident than the conquest and governance of colonies. 
                                                        
22 Scott Kugle outlines some of these arguments in his insightful exposition of the development of Anglo-
Muhammadan Law. See, Kugle, 'Framed, Blamed and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic Jurisprudence in 
Colonial South Asia', 258, 269. Tirthankar Roy, in a similar note, presents a detailed account of the 
transformation of agriculture, manufacturing and market integration in the Indian sub-continent in the 
context of colonialism. This work takes a ‘neutral’ stance towards imperial policies and focusses primarily 
on the economic dimension of colonial enterprise. See, ‘Colonialism and Development’ in Tirthankar Roy, 
India in the World Economy: From Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge University Press, New York 2012) 
181-209. 
23 William H. Morley, The Administration of Justice in British India: Its past history and present state (Williams 
and Northgate, London 1858) 177. 
24 Anibal Quijano, 'Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America' (2000) 1 Nepentla: Views from 
South 533, 552. 
25 Dirks, 'Introduction: Colonialism and Culture' 3. 
26 Ibid 5. 
27 Shalini Randeria, 'Entangled Histories: Civil Society, Caste Solidarities and Legal Pluralism in Post-
colonial India' in John Keane (ed), Civil Society: Berlin Perspectives (Berghahn Books, New York 2006) 226. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Dirks, 'Introduction: Colonialism and Culture' 176. 
30 As Foucault suggests, there is a constant ‘articulation… of power on knowledge and knowledge on power.’ 
Colin Gordon (ed), Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 by Michel Foucault 
(Harvester Press, Brighton 1980) 51. 
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It might be argued, however, that to talk of colonialism in the singular in this context is 
as problematic as the reductionism being critiqued here. While countering the essentialisation 
by this knowledge-based enterprise, we run the risk of painting the colonial empire(s) as 
monolithic and static across space and time, or completely devoid of resistance and 
collaboration on part of the colonised.31 The disharmonious co-existence of the discordant 
voices and norms is, after all, what characterises the contrapuntal development of nomoi in the 
colonies. But while the charge of oversimplification is granted, it is argued here that there was 
a certain commonality in the colonial enterprise(s) that can be identified and problematised. 
This was above all an epistemological project that veiled, as well as caused, domination and 
appropriation. It created a divide between the culture and laws of ‘science, progress, rationality, 
and modernity’32 on the one side and ‘savagery and barbarian despotisms’33 on the other. This 
differentiation between the rational and the irrational, between modern and primitive, and 
between civilised and savage is what marked the British colonial empire in the Indian sub-
continent. 
In this regard, it is argued here that it is not simply the specific colonial practices that 
need to be problematised but the logics that governed them and the epistemology that guided 
them and, taking a lead from Anibal Quijano and Walter Mignolo, the paper terms this 
enterprise as Coloniality.34 The assertion here is that Coloniality can be examined as an abstract 
idea, with colonialism(s) mainly appearing as its historical manifestation. Divesting these 
notions of colonial law and Coloniality from the actual historical event of colonialism changes 
the mode of analysis and permits us to focus on the underlying principles in the backdrop of 
the express policies. Discussing this concept in the framework of knowledge, 
modernity/rationality and European/Western domination, Quijano argues that Coloniality ‘is 
still the most general form of domination in the world today, even after colonialism as an 
explicit political order was destroyed.’35 Linking Coloniality to modernity, he maintains that 
they are mutually constitutive36 and this duality, in the Eurocentric experience in relation to the 
rest of the world, represented a ‘specific rationality or perspective of knowledge that was made 
globally hegemonic.’37 More than merely an Empire based on political considerations and 
material forces, it was this rationality and knowledge that colonised and overwhelmed other 
conceptions, formulations, knowledges and people.  
Coloniality, and therefore colonialism that stemmed from it, was not only a political act 
of conquest or domination, but involved a cognitive engagement for the colonisers as well as 
the colonised, which was based on racial, cultural, temporal, historical and systemic 
                                                        
31 Dirks, 'Introduction: Colonialism and Culture' 7-9. 
32 Ibid 7. 
33 Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (Routledge, London 1992) 81. 
34 Quijano was the first theorist to coin the terminology of Coloniality of Power, and applied it to the Latin 
American situation. See,  Quijano, 'Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America'. Also see, 
Walter D. Mignolo, 'Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Though and Decolonial Freedom' (2009) 26 
Theory Culture Society 159. 
35 Anibal Quijano, 'Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality' (2007) 21 Cultural Studies 168 170. 
36 Quijano, 'Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America' 548. 
37 Ibid 549. 
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differentiation.38 This mode of analysis is similar to Boaventura De Sousa Santos’s 
examination of colonialism as an epistemologically hegemonic project that, he argues, 
generated an ‘abyssal divide’ between the coloniser and the colonised.39 Santos contends that 
the abyssal thinking that lies at the heart of modernity and colonialism continues in the post-
colonial era and which, in addition to dividing the colonial and the colonised, renders the latter 
absent and invisible. Those who are excluded and colonised cease to exist ‘in any relevant or 
comprehensible way of being.’40 Taking Coloniality both as the form and logic of domination, 
Quijano employs this category to describe, not just the occurrences during colonialism, but also 
the power disparity, hegemony and global inequality that continues in the post-colonial era and 
prevails in post-colonial contexts.41 Based on this, Escobar writes that Coloniality as an idea 
‘incorporates colonialism and imperialism but goes beyond them; this is why Coloniality did 
not end with the end of colonialism… but was rearticulated.’42  
Coloniality, then, is a ‘totalitarian’ conception that encounters other knowledges, 
rationalities and systems, and asserts itself as the sole and ultimate truth.43 Mignolo suggests 
that taken in this sense of a totality, Coloniality represents a conception ‘that negates, excludes, 
occludes the difference and the possibilities of other totalities.’44 It is, then, the knowledge that 
debases other knowledges; the rationality that mutilates, appropriates or destroys other 
rationalities. This notion of Coloniality, which Mignolo considers as Ego-logy45 (a rational, 
paradigmatic and historical solipsism), appears as ‘engulfing and at the same time defensive 
and exclusionary.’46 The power of this assertion of ‘I/Mine’ is, thus, exclusionary at the point 
of inclusion. Significantly, in this view Coloniality is conceptualised as a systemic tendency 
which can be present in systems other than those emerging from the European traditions of 
colonialism or modernity/rationality, as long as the totalitarian characteristics remain at the 
core of such systems. Understanding Coloniality as the epistemological logic behind 
colonialism and approaching it as a totality that negates and excludes difference and the 
possibility of other totalities permits us to focus on Coloniality in Law47 that laid the socio-
legal terrain of the Indian sub-continent and continues to guide its contestations in the post-
colonial period. 
                                                        
38 Quijano, 'Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality' 171-173. 
39 Boaventura De Sousa Santos, 'A Non-Occidentalist West? Learned Ignorance and Ecology of Knowledge' 
(2009) 26 Theory Culture Society 103, 113-114. 
40 Boaventura De Sousa Santos, 'Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledges' 
(2007) XXX Review Fernand Braudel Center 45, 45. 
41 Quijano, 'Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality' 176-178. 
42 Arturo Escobar, 'Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality and Anti-Globalisation 
Social Movements' (2004) 25 Third World Quarterly 207, 219. 
43 Walter D. Mignolo, 'Delinking: The Rhetoric of modernity, the logic of coloniality and the grammar of 
de-coloniality' (2007) 21 Cultural Studies 449, 451. 
44 Ibid. 
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4 COLONIALITY AND THE NORMATIVE ORDERINGS IN THE 
INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT 
If Coloniality reveals the transformation of rationalities, appropriation of norms, destruction of 
knowledges and creation of totalities by the colonial enterprise, the religious and indigenous 
normative orderings in the sub-continent offer the most pertinent examples of this encounter. 
While the purpose here is not to paint any romanticised picture of the indigenous normative 
orderings, there was nonetheless a marked difference between the structures and perceptions 
of law that existed in the sub-continent before the advent of the British Empire in comparison 
to the ones that emerged through this engagement. 
The history of Panchayats, Jirgas and Faislos (local courts in different regions) in 
South Asia dates back centuries, and predates the formalisation of law during colonial times.48 
Elphinstone, during his journey through the Frontier region of the sub-continent in 1809, 
regarded the Jirga to be in a ‘remarkably high state of organisation’.49 The British Imperial 
Gazetteer of India mentioned that ‘for the ordinary rustic, it is caste and the Panchayat or caste-
council that enforce the only moral code which he understands.’50 The Gazetteer also 
acknowledged that ‘most civil suits are referred by the Hakims (rulers) of districts to a 
panchayat (council of elders).’51 The amalgamation of religious, cultural and communal courts, 
therefore, were not merely communitarian tribunals but possessed efficacy and legitimacy as 
courts of dispute resolution and criminal tribunals, bringing together the varied norms that 
existed in a particular locality. Galanter writes that in pre-colonial India, ‘there were 
innumerable, overlapping local jurisdictions and many groups enjoyed one or another degree 
of autonomy in administering law to themselves.’52 These groupings did not relate to any single 
mode of classification – religion, caste, culture, geography and locality all played different 
roles in constructing their own legal and normative spheres. But while widely existent and 
respected as forums of dispute resolution and punishing criminality, such tribunals did not 
adhere to formalistic structures.  Galanater further elaborates that  
The relation of the “highest” and most authoritative parts of the legal system to the 
“lower” end of the system was not that of superior to subordinate in a bureaucratic 
hierarchy…. Instead of systematic imposition, of “higher” law on lesser tribunals, there 
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was a general diffusion by filtering down (and occasionally up) of ideas and techniques 
by conscious imitation and by movement of personnel.53 
 
However, as these tribunals were primarily based on an oral tradition of law,54 few traces of 
the pre-colonial traditional legal systems remain. The systems of local tribunals, along with 
various other traditional and indigenous normative systems, exist today as mediated by two 
centuries of colonial rule. With the advent of the British, these local systems of justice, some 
of which were equated to Athenian model of democracy,55 underwent radical transformation. 
Galanter, notwithstanding his praise for the unification and modernisation of Indian customary 
law by the colonial regime, highlights three major changes that the local and customary systems 
underwent.56 These entailed the shift in the administration of indigenous law from informal to 
formal court, restrictions on the geographical and substantive remits of the informal courts, and 
the transformation of the local norms through their application by the state courts.57 These 
changes radically altered and limited the structure, substantive content, jurisdiction and 
efficacy of customary law in the region. 
Shah writes that through this appropriation, scripting and application based on common 
law method, the custom itself went through major changes as ‘the British imperialists 
narrativised, defined and codified custom and formalised the informal.’58 But the ossification 
of this facet of sub-continent’s ‘living law’59 was not the only outcome of the colonial 
encounter, as the local customary systems were co-opted further in the interest of the empire. 
While curtailed and even outlawed in some areas of the colony, where they were actively 
replaced by state courts, the tribunals such as jirgas were effectively incorporated in other 
regions for the control and exclusion of the local communities.60 In regions which now 
formulate the provinces of Punjab and Sindh in modern day Pakistan, the British were able to 
establish the multiple institutions necessary to carry out the core functions for the colonial state: 
revenue extraction mechanisms, courts and policing institutions, among others.61 The existence 
of panchayats and faislos, therefore, ceased to be essential for the functioning of the state. In 
the Frontier and Balochistan regions, however, the British regime was not able to expand its 
rule in the same manner, and the colonial state resorted to including the system of jirgas within 
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its legal framework to control these territories. Laws, such as the Frontier Crimes Regulations, 
instituted the category of official jirgas that operated at the behest of the state to apply (state 
authorised version of) customary law, and acted as the main judicial body within the tribal 
regions. These appropriated ‘official jirgas’ are differentiated from the ‘traditional jirgas’ as 
they apply a mutilated version of customary law,62 and they still exist as a parallel system of 
law in Pakistan as part of the legal framework governing the Tribal Regions.  
After independence, these tribunals faced different trajectories. In India, the panchayat 
was considered a necessary part of village life and local government, and thus it was included 
and subsumed within the local government structure.63 In Pakistan, although these local courts 
are considered part of rural life as a de facto condition, the state does not formally accept their 
legitimacy or legality, continuing the policy of appropriation and exclusion.64 The jirgas in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, however, are considered a part of the constitutional and 
legal frameworks with the continuation of the Frontier Crimes Regulations as a colonial legacy. 
As previously stated, the aim here is not to present a romanticised view of the 
indigenous and local normative orderings as these local tribunals, in their modern 
manifestation, do pose problems of patriarchy and human rights violations. Rights activists and 
political commentators generally denounce the continuation of these traditional tribunals, both 
on account of their existence as a parallel judicial system as well as their perceived 
incompatibility with human rights.65 They argue that the traditional and local normative 
orderings reflect skewed structures of power, patriarchy, misogyny and religious 
totalitarianism.66 There have been numerous instances in which the rulings and conduct of the 
local courts have resulted in persecution of women and the marginalised communities. 
However, the exclusion and appropriation of the localised systems of justice through 
imposition of a different normative order (which violated the rights of individuals in an 
altogether different manner) highlights the epistemic injustice at the heart of the colonial 
enterprise. 
The colonial encounter, thus, radically altered the nature of the traditional and 
customary laws that existed in the region.67 The traditional systems that could prove to be 
beneficial for the governance needs of the colonial state were altered and subsumed within the 
overall state structure,68 while those that were not needed for administrative or regulatory 
purposes were disregarded. This manner of selective engagement with traditional normative 
orders has continued in the region in the post-independence period.  
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But the writing and recording of differences ‘to make sense of the multiplicity of 
cultural norms’ led not just to the ‘fossilisation of culture,’69 but also led to the appropriation, 
classification and transformation of the religious normative orders in the region. These 
normative systems linked with sub-continental religions, particularly Islamic conceptions as is 
the focus here, faced a similar fate. It is asserted here that this engagement completely altered 
the nature and rationality of these religious orderings.  
In terms of religious law, the most substantial move was perhaps the shift in the nature 
of religious laws from personal to territorial. The Imperial Gazetteer of India,70 which was first 
published in 1881 (with the new edition cited here published in 1909), noted that the 
‘indigenous law of India is personal’71 and then went on to classify this law between two major 
groups: the Hindu and Muhammadan. Based on this knowledge, it then moves further to state 
that at the advent of the British in India 
[T]he natural consequence would have been their [colonial administrators’] submission 
to Native law. But there was, in the first place, no lex loci to govern the new comers, 
for the idea of a territorial, as opposed to a personal law, is of European and modern 
origin, and the Shastras and Koran alike know no local limits, but bind individuals 
united only by a common faith.72 
 
These normative systems, then, were not considered to constitute the law as judged through the 
lens of Modernity. Henry Maine, for instance, had argued about India being ‘singularly empty 
of law’ at the time of colonisation.73 But statements such as these emerged from the vantage 
point of the dominant power and were themselves based on a restrictive notion of law and its 
sources, institutions or even purpose. Based on this perceived absence of law, the overall 
tendency of the British colonial administration was to ‘make their law public and territorial,’74 
which would apply equally to natives and colonial incomers. This, however, was not a uniform 
approach and changed during the course of imperial rule as the role and needs of the colonial 
regime evolved over time. Initially concerned more with trade and less with matter of 
governance, the regime (of what was then the East India Company) promulgated through the 
British Parliament’s Declaratory Act of 1780, that ‘as against a Hindu, the Hindu law and 
usage, and as against a Muhammadan the laws and customs of Islam, should be applied.’75 
Notwithstanding the problems with the very decision and power to determine the applicability 
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of laws in such a manner, the colonial knowledge of the so-called laws and customs of Hindus 
and Muhammadans was itself problematic. The assumption that Muslims and Hindus were 
‘homogenous communities following uniform laws’ was itself a ‘legal fiction’76 that, coupled 
with the strict rooting of these laws in scriptures, lead to ‘the Brahminisation and Islamisation 
of laws.’77 Hindus and Muslims were heterogeneous communities involving several different 
sub-communities of practice, diversity of interpretations and lacked any formal code that could 
be applied readily to all who were part of these larger religious denominations. There was the 
additional problem of smaller segments of the population belonging to other religious systems 
such as Jains and Sikhs who, in the interest of convenience and arising from a profound lack 
of understanding, were heaped together in the category of Hindus.78 
Even when the laws of different communities were applied in parallel, the authority of 
adjudication was vested in British courts and judges, assisted by religious scholars as court 
officers.79 The rulings issued by these court officers were taken mainly as guidance and were 
liable to be overturned by the judges. But the application of these laws, especially by those who 
knew neither the language nor the principles of these normative systems, required a certain 
corpus of norms and codes of laws. In an insightful account of the development of Anglo-
Muhammadan Law, Scott Kugle suggests that there were two different dimensions of 
codification linked to this sphere of law: conceptual and textual.80 In relation to conceptual 
codification, the British administrators assumed ‘Islamic law’, as well as Hindu law for that 
matter, to exist as a single code, providing one correct or dominant interpretation in each 
circumstance. This view of the religious orderings was more a reflection of the assumptions of 
the colonial administrators and judges than anything that existed in the systems themselves. 
Associated with the conceptual dimension was the textual codification which, Morley writes, 
was an exercise in the reduction of ‘uncertainties’ of the religious legal structures.81  
Kugle suggests that there was only a limited number of texts linked to particular schools 
of jurisprudence within the Islamic corpus that could be translated and thus became the 
foundational texts of the Anglo-Muhammadan Law.82 Similarly, Anderson writes that the 
textual foundation of Anglo-Muhammadan law was primarily based on three texts translated 
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during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – the al-Hidaya (a compilation of texts from the 
Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence); al-Sirajiyya (which covered inheritance issues); and 
Baillie’s A Digest of Moohammudan Law, which included abbreviations and portions of Shi’a 
jurisprudence and Fatwa Alamgiri (the seventeenth century anthology of Shariah law, mainly 
based on Hanafi jurisprudence, compiled during Aurangzeb’s Empire).83 Some errors in the 
translations were discovered during the nineteenth century, but were never incorporated in the 
English versions.84 The subtleties of judicial reasoning and debate within Islamic jurisprudence 
were also removed so as to minimise perceived ambiguities.85 Moreover, the religious rulings 
which were neither based around adversarial practices of law, nor were meant to be binding on 
others, were incorporated and transformed through the practices of the courts and the 
development of a legal corpus through binding precedents. The appropriation of Islamic law 
by the colonial legal framework divested it of the complexity of its perspectives, the 
multiplicity of outlooks and the differences of opinion. More significantly, it increased its 
rigidity and radically altered its substantive rationality to a formal one.86 Once tied to a formal 
code and binding judgements, the possibility of evolution within the religious normative 
orderings became linked with the external authority of the state – the religious code became 
static and ‘later Muslims sought to regain political power through rhetoric justified by this 
exact “colonised” sharia [Islamic jurisprudence].’87 It is this return within and through a 
tainted frame of reference, using the notions of totalitarian rationalities, which mark some of 
the struggles of the contemporary period. 
There are certainly those who praise the colonial law for removing ‘the angularities of 
the law of Islam’ and bringing it ‘in line with the modern notions of social justice.’88 The British 
accounts of the time themselves mention that the interests of modernity, equity and justice 
created the ‘impossibility of allowing the crude penal law of the Muslaman system to be 
followed… and here also radical alterations were made.’89 The Imperial Gazetteer 
acknowledges that 
Owing to the influence of Western jurisprudence, to the case-law emanating from the 
courts established and moulded on English models, to the advance of enlightened ideas, 
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and to the progress of education, the rules of the Shastras and the Koran have gradually 
been altered and relaxed.90 
 
But such perspectives ignore or hide the very injustice, inequality and ‘epistemic violence’91 
that lie at the heart of this classificatory enterprise. The codification, appropriation and 
‘removal of angularities’92 in existing laws and customs was not an exercise in advancing 
justice, but served as an aid to conquest and domination. It led both to the fossilisation of 
religion, culture, customs and norms, as well as to their impoverishment. More significantly, it 
led to a transformation of rationality that lay at the heart of the religious normative orderings 
and turned these into rigid systems with totalitarian rationalities. The understanding of Islamic 
principles applied by British Indian courts and administrators mainly stemmed from 
translations of selected texts, which disregarded the diversity of opinions, schools of thought 
and sects within Islam. The dynamics of Islam’s historical and dialectical evolution meant that 
‘unity in diversity’93 and differences of opinions had become cornerstones of Islamic 
jurisprudence. This is precisely what is exhibited by concepts such as Ikhtilaf (‘the tolerated 
diversity of human opinion’)94 and the presence of multiple schools of thought in Islamic 
jurisprudence. The translation, codification and appropriation generated and embedded ‘an 
essentialist, static Islam incapable of change from within,’95 which marked the trajectory of the 
understanding and application of Islamic law in the region even post-independence. 
 It should be noted here that the argument should not imply a complete loss of agency 
on the part of Muslim jurists, or scholars of other religions. Scholars and experts engaged with 
the colonial legal policies on different terms – on the one side of the spectrum there were those 
who supported the colonial legal enterprise in the name of ‘modernisation’; on the other, those 
who attempted to engage in new ways to challenge or disrupt the appropriation and 
modification of norms.96 Hussin addresses this ‘politics of Islamic law’ where local elites and 
religious scholars played a part in the codification and formalisation of Islamic law, albeit 
within the boundaries laid by the colonial enterprise.97 The resistance or cooperation both 
occurred in the context of the questions raised by the colonial encounter; the terrain of 
contestation confined within the topos laid out by the colonial administration. While the 
colonial legal project may not have removed native agency completely, it provided a ‘societal 
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and epistemological paradigm’ that shaped the ‘horizon of possibilities’ within which options 
of cooperation or resistance were chosen.98 
 Colonialism transformed a ‘living law’99 into ossified conceptions perpetually geared 
towards the past. It distorted the ‘law of the jurists’ that was free from the idea of binding 
precedents and was predisposed to ‘respond to its immediate social context’100 to a stagnant 
and fossilised version of itself. Based on this, Ali asserts that ‘by codifying Islamic law, the 
rich variation and flexibility in interpreting the religious text in Islam was lost and is a burden 
carried over to the post-colonial era.’101 Colonialism, then, lays the very terrain on which the 
legal architecture of the Indian sub-continent stands; it pervades the very fabric on which the 
socio-legal architecture is built. While the continuation of colonial laws is evident within the 
formal legal system and common law tradition, this historical legacy also lies at the foundation 
of customary or traditional orderings and the Islamic conceptions currently dominant in the 
region. 
 
5 COLONIALITY AND THE CONFLICT OF LEGAL RATIONALITIES 
It has been discussed above how colonialism employed the instrumentality of law to impose 
its particular rationality and knowledge on the Indian sub-continent – the cognitive element 
that was both a necessity and a corollary of conquest.102 In this process, the legal frameworks 
that existed in the region prior to colonial arrival also underwent a radical shift. But the logics 
of Coloniality, once introduced in the region, did not end with the so-termed decolonisation 
movements of the first half of the twentieth century. This idea of Coloniality became tied to 
the instrumentality of law and the state and was carried over to the post-independence period. 
Quijano, Mignolo and others argue that what lies at the heart of the continued disparity of 
power in the post-colonial era are global power structures and the Eurocentric paradigm.103 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is argued here that the link between Coloniality and 
instrumentality of law and their encounter with the local normative orderings, particularly in 
relation to Islamic conceptions, was far greater than the analysis on Anglo-Muhammadan or 
Muslim Personal Law would highlight. A significant shift that Coloniality introduced within 
the socio-legal system of the region was the co-optation or transformation of not just existent 
legal systems, but also their underlying rationalities. It altered the inter-personal laws to 
territorial ones; it reduced customary, religious and traditional legal norms, based on a diversity 
of opinions, into strict textual modes of law.  
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While scholars argue that this change in the rationalities of law can be traced to the 
‘unfinished project of Modernity’,104 a detailed discussion on the Modernity/Rationality link 
will have to be dealt elsewhere. Nonetheless, it is contended here that territorial, static and 
fossilised nature of law that was introduced in the sub-continent has now become so embedded 
within the socio-legal terrain, that Quijano and Mignolo’s linking (or limitation) of Coloniality 
to Eurocentric rationalities requires a reconsideration. Grosfoguel, for instance, writes that 
‘unlike other traditions of knowledge, the western is a point of view that does not assume itself 
as a point of view.’105 However, looking at the contestation surrounding the Islamic narrative 
in Pakistan, this seems like a romanticised notion of non-Western traditions of knowledge. The 
propagation by the Eurocentric civilisation of a particular Ego-logical perspective,106 although 
historically dominant, is not the only instance where Coloniality is visible today. Other 
totalitarian claims, and particularly the ‘Islamist’ political claims in the region, stem from the 
same principle and exhibit the same motivation. They too assume the mantle of sole truths and 
singular conceptions of the world, and refuse to consider themselves as points of view.107 
This clash of rival rationalities provides us a more nuanced insight into the conflict and 
contestation between competing legal and normative orderings in Pakistan. One of the major 
historical crises that has dominated the constitutional and legal developments in Pakistan is 
related to its identity. Claiming to represent a new homeland for the Muslims of the Indian sub-
continent, the country’s legal and constitutional frameworks could never shape this idea into a 
viable working charter.108 While Islam proved to be the most potent symbol that could give a 
semblance of unity to this ‘inoperative community’,109 whether this was meant to be translated 
into a democratic or a theocratic state is still an unresolved question. The ambiguity of this 
notion has had major impacts on the legal architecture, as it has created room for the rise of 
religious militant discourse. Religious political parties and militant groups continue to assert 
that the country was founded in the name of Islam and through political manoeuvring, and 
outright violence in some instances, these groups have proved successful in making the Islamic 
narrative as a competing and strong facet of Pakistan’s legal context. This political struggle, 
then, is characterised by the wish to return to a ‘pre-colonial’ point, but it is unable to escape 
the tainted reference point and is trapped within the framework of the rigid, totalitarian and 
exclusive rationality.110 
                                                        
104 Werner Menski, 'Flying kites in Pakistan: Turbulences in theory and practice' (2010) 1 Journal of Law 
and Social Research 41, 46. 
105 Ramón Grosfoguel, 'A Decolonial Approach to Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking 
and Global Coloniality' (2009) 6 KULT 10, 11. 
106 Mignolo, 'Delinking: The Rhetoric of modernity, the logic of coloniality and the grammar of de-
coloniality' 459-460. 
107 Grosfoguel, 'A Decolonial Approach to Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global 
Coloniality' 11. 
108 See, generally, Hamza Alavi, 'Ethnicity, Muslim Society, and the Pakistan Ideology' in Anita Weiss (ed), 
Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan (Syracuse University press, Syracuse 1986). 
109 See Jean-Luc Nancy, 'The Inoperative Community' in Peter Connor (ed), The Inoperative Community, 
vol 76 (University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota 1991). 
110 Giunchi refers to this search for a pure historical reference point as ‘abandoning history’ (borrowing 
from Edward Said) or an ‘invented tradition’ (in the terms of Eric Hobsbawm). Giunchi, 'The Reinvention 
of Sharī‘a under the British Raj: In Search of Authenticity and Certainty', 1119-1120. 
19 
 
What lies at the heart of the struggle between secular law and Islamic law, between 
mainstream legal frameworks and that which stands to challenge them, is the struggle of rival 
conceptions based on Coloniality and totalitarian notions of law. The engendering of 
totalitarian and colonial rationalities in the sub-continent has meant that the socio-legal system 
of Pakistan is caught within two rival totalitarian notions. On the one hand is the system that is 
linked to the state-run legal system inherited from the colonial state; while on the other is the 
religious notion of law and politics which was adopted to provide a semblance of identity to 
the country. Both of these totalitarian conceptions struggle to gain greater control of the state, 
and deny the possibility of existence, not just to each other, but also to local mechanisms of 
justice and the marginalised sections of the society. A corollary of this is that the law of 
Pakistan presents not a harmonious pluralistic system of multiple normative orders, but an 
uncertain and violent amalgam of common law, secularism and religious law. The Coloniality 
and totality embedded in the mainstream legal narrative as well as the Islamic discourse has 
dominated the legal history of Pakistan, and will continue on this path unless their foundational 
paradigms are challenged. In this vein, it is argued here that it is not the assertions of either of 
these two narratives that can resolve the conflict, but rather a de-colonial deconstruction of the 
two.111 With the acknowledgement that this requires considerable further analysis, this paper 
nonetheless provides a step in this direction. 
 
6 CONCLUSION: LAW AND DE-COLONIALITY 
The foregoing discussion has attempted to present a more nuanced understanding to approach 
and the socio-legal architecture of the sub-continent and the clash of ideologies in Pakistan. It 
has been argued above that colonialism and Coloniality form the very terrain on which the 
contestations of the multiple normative and legal order now occur. Through this lens of 
Coloniality and its link with the instrumentality of law, the discussion introduced the issue of 
a totalitarian rationality at the heart of legal orderings which emerged in the legal system of the 
sub-continent, and was later inherited by Pakistan. It should be highlighted that the claim made 
here is significantly different from the ideas of post-independence colonial continuities that 
have been debated in post-colonial literature, especially in relation to South Asian and African 
countries.112 The crucial difference is that recognition of post-colonial and historical 
continuities113 focusses more on material manifestations rather than the logics that govern these 
continuities, which the framework of Coloniality transcends. The mere acknowledgement of 
continuities does not offer a framework to move beyond this recognition, and is trapped within 
                                                        
111 Borrowing an insight from Mignolo. Mignolo, 'Delinking: The Rhetoric of modernity, the logic of 
coloniality and the grammar of de-coloniality'. 
112 See, for instance, Katharine Adeney, 'Constitutional Centring: Nation Formation and Consociational 
Federalism in India and Pakistan' (2002) 40 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 8; Richard Higgott, 
'Structural dependence and decolonisation in a West African land‐locked state: Niger' (1980) 7 Review of 
African Political Economy 43. 
113 See, Introduction in John Dunn, West African States, Failure and Promise: A study in comparative politics 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1978). 
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the same paradox it attempts to critique. The notion of Coloniality has been adopted here to 
move beyond these weaknesses. 
The recognition that the major contradictions and struggles within the socio-legal setup 
of the sub-continent, and particularly the architecture of Pakistan, are born out of colonialism 
moves the analysis further, but only to a limited extent. While the ‘vigilance to the colonial 
legacy’ in the context of law is essential, ‘Where do we go from here?’ is the question that 
emerges from this and requires due attention. It is argued here that the recognition and 
problematisation of the colonial legacy of law in this context, and indeed other post-colonial 
countries, can mainly lead to three divergent options. One possibility is to continue with the 
existing state of affairs, acknowledging the troubled histories of legal orders; reforming them 
to address the situation, tweaking and tuning them to respond to the generally perceived 
problems, operating within the overarching and inherited frameworks. This, however, is a false 
choice.114 Given the situation, the detrimental effects of the current structures and narratives 
for the people, the ‘ubiquitous suffering’115 that haunts day to day living in some of these 
contexts, opting for status quo is not really an option if the situation is considered from the 
vantage point of the marginalised.  
Another course that emerges from the foregoing problematisation is that an admission 
of the colonial legacy should lead to its reversal and to an overturning of its laws, institutions 
and impact. Its demand is to radically ‘transform and abrupt’ the colonial legal legacy, 
‘severing the past from the present.’116 This argument calls for a return to the local, traditional, 
and indigenous. This stance is visibly adopted by those who advocate religious or romanticised 
notions of indigenous law to denounce the alien law and assert the significance of their own 
legal modalities. However, appealing as it may seem, it is far more problematic than it appears 
in the first instance. As considered previously, colonialism implemented not just its own 
version of formal law in the region, but radically transformed the nature of the indigenous, 
cultural, religious and local normative orders. In the modern manifestation, the local, traditional 
and religious systems as they exist in the region are formations of the colonial encounter. And 
given that their modern origins are rooted in colonial history, no religious, local or cultural 
ordering can claim to be pure and truly indigenous.  
                                                        
114 Jayan Nayar, 'The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-the-World: Thinking Exteriority' (2013) 24 Law 
and Critique 63, 64. 
115 As Upendra Baxi argues, ‘Suffering is ubiquitous to the point of being natural’. Upendra Baxi, 'Voices of 
Suffering and the Future of Human Rights' (1998) 8 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 125, 
131. He even criticises the grammar of the current human rights discourse that ‘dissipate human and 
social suffering, at times to a point of social illegibility.’ Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi 2006) xvi. For an exposition of the conceptual category of suffering and its 
engagement with the western philosophical discourse, see Nayar, 'The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-
the-World: Thinking Exteriority' 
116 Matthew C. R. Craven, The decolonization of international law: State Succession and the Law of Treaties 
(Oxford Monographs in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 19. Craven identifies 
these first two modes of decolonisation (evolution and radical transformation) in relation to International 
Law, and its post-colonial manifestation. 
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The idea, then, of a romanticised pre-colonial mode of legality or normativity to which 
a return is possible is nothing more than a ‘myth’117 and a fallacy. And this romanticised fallacy 
ignores both the radical transformation that the region’s existing normative and legal systems 
underwent as well as the fact that these systems themselves were and are rooted in their own 
respective modes of exclusion, patriarchy, coercion and repression. The religious and local 
mechanisms of justice that we see today, therefore, cannot be considered manifestations of the 
pre-colonial, or as viable reference points for de-colonisation. Moreover, even if the de-
colonisation to the pre-colonial is accepted in principle, where does the search for a truly pure 
and indigenous system end? Should it move beyond the British Crown’s reign to preceding 
centuries of Muslim Empires, as even these were external influences at one point in time, or 
perhaps even beyond that? Any idealised notion of pre-colonial religious and customary laws 
as untainted and unadulterated systems representing the true ethos of the society and beliefs of 
the people serves the purpose of rhetoric well, but it does not offer any concrete possibilities 
of real change.  
Finally, and significantly, the most viable option then is to interpret the socio-legal 
context and the idea of colonialism and law differently; to think of new avenues to read, analyse 
and (re)form the legal realities of the country.118 If a return to the pre-colonial is not possible, 
can we move towards some conception or formulation of law in this context that is ‘de-
colonial’?119 From this perspective, it is the identifiable facets of colonial law – judgement 
of/on the other; totalitarian rationalities; appropriation of knowledge and norms; 
unaccountability; systems based on alienation of those it purports to govern; aligning of state 
with the interests of specific groups, classes and personalities – that need to be recognised and 
challenged. This is where the concept of Coloniality in Law allows us to go further than the 
prevalent narratives to law. Mignolo asserts that approaching the idea of hegemony, of 
knowledge as well as its material manifestations, through Coloniality and its totalitarian nature 
opens up the door to its examination, critique and restructuring from the outside.120 This 
outsider’s perspective offers a possibility that, he argues, post-colonialism and post-modernity 
do not entail, as they remain part of the internal critique of colonialism, modernity and 
Eurocentrism.121 Conceptualising the situation in these terms does not ‘lead necessarily to post-
coloniality, but to de-coloniality.’122 De-coloniality requires the consideration of other 
                                                        
117 Myth is used here in the sense in which Peter Fitzpatrick proposes it, as ‘the world of limits which 
captures those within it.’ Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law 24. 
118 See, generally, Jayan Nayar, 'Peoples' Law: Decolonising Legal Imagination' Law, Social Justice & Global 
Development <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2007_1/nayar/> accessed 10 June 
2010; Amita Dhanda and Archana Parashar, 'Decolonisation of Legal Knowledge: Whose Responsibility?' 
in Amita Dhanda and Archana Parashar (eds), Decolonisation of Legal Knowledge (Routledge, Abingdon 
2009); Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and 
Emancipation (Law in Context, Butterworths LexisNexis, London 2002). 
119 Walter D. Mignolo, 'Geopolitics of sensing and knowing: On (de)coloniality, border thinking, and 
epistemic disobedience' (2013) 1 Confero: Essays on Education, Philosophy and Politics 129. 
120 Mignolo, 'Delinking: The Rhetoric of modernity, the logic of coloniality and the grammar of de-
coloniality' 451. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid 452. 
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knowledges, other rationalities, other forms, as it essentially ‘starts from other sources.’123 This 
idea of de-coloniality, then, marks the most urgent and pressing task for socio-legal scholars 
of the region and religion today. The need of the time, in this sense, is to understand law through 
alternative lenses – as part of ‘ecology of knowledges’,124 a ‘decolonisation of legal 
imagination’125 or a ‘de-linking’ from the dominant narratives and systems ‘as an epistemic de-
colonisation’.126  
A potent direction to identify a de-colonial approach to law is to look towards 
experiments of the creation of legal meaning conceived by people on the ground, as 
documented by Santos, Mignolo and others.127 Such initiatives provide us instances of how 
local mechanisms of justice may be used by marginalised groups to move beyond the forms 
and procedures of dominant law, as well as beyond the patriarchal confines of local normative 
orderings. The value of these experiments, albeit symbolic, is in presenting a challenge to our 
conceptions of law and our notions of justice. It is towards these steps that the focus of socio-
legal and legal-theoretical discussions should lie, for such attempts towards de-coloniality can 
help us surpass our limitations, assumptions and preconceptions of the law. 
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